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IN THE

SUPRE~IB

COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
District Court No. 2433
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 14636

RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA,
Defendant and Appellant,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT, RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case in which defendant-appellant seeks a
reversal of the Second Judicial District Court's denial of
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Suppression of
Evidence and Motion for a New Trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was arraigned before the Second Judicial
District Court of Davis County, State of Utah on March 30,
1976, at which time, trial was set for April 30, 1976 at
9:00 a.m. which trial setting was vacated and rescheduled
for June 9, 1976.

Defendant filed his Motion for an

Earlier Trial Date on the 3rd day of May, 1976 and when
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said trial date was not given at an earlier date, a
Motion to Dismiss was filed on June 3, 1976 but due to
the date of the filing of said Motion and its having been
filed less than a week prior to trial, no hearing was
held upon the said Motion until the trial of June 9,
1976.Because there had been no hearing prior to trial,
the Court denied defendant's Motion for dismissal.
On April 19, 1976, defendant-appellant filed his Motion
to Suppress Evidence on the grounds that he had signed a
statement which constituted a confession and admission when,
in fact, he could not read or write the English language and
further basing said Motion upon the fact that he was intoxicated and drunk from alcoholic beverages at the time of
the signing of the said confession.

Said Motion was again

made at the time of trial and reserved during the

continu~nce

of the trial and later denied by the Court.
During the course of the trial, defendant's mother, Mrs.
Pr:isdlla Flores, testified under cross-examination by the
State, stating that the defendant had been in prison and
based upon that, the defendant moved for a new trial.

No

decision order issued as a result of that motion and the
defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a
period of one to fifteen years.

Counsel for the defendant,

who has been appointed by the Court, filed a Notice of Appeal
-2-
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on the 17th day of June, 1976 and then filed his Notice of
Withdrawal.

The defendant himself filed a Notice of Appeal

in his own handwriting on the 7th of July, 1976 and it is
pursuant to those Notices of Appeal that this matter is
brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Concurrent with the filing of the Notice of Appearance by
counsel was the filing of a Designation of Record on Appeal
which, in part, asked for a transcript to be prepared at
County expense on behalf of defendant-appellant which was
resisted by the County so that due to the failure of the
County to appoint an attorney or otherwise provide representation and the delays

associated with defense counsel's

attempt to enforce the provision for the defendant of a
transcript, defendant has been in prison since June 9, 1976
to the present time and had not received a transcript of
the trial itself until October 3, 1977.

For this reason,

a Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus accompanies the brief
herein.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant asks that the judgments of the lower
Court be reversed with respect to the Motion to Dismiss, the
Motion to Suppress Evidence and the Motion for a New Trial and
further that defendant be granted the relief sought in his
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
March 30, 1976, &efendant was arraigned on a charge
of burglary and trial was scheduled for April 30, 1976,
for which notice was mailed to counsel.

(R 10, 11)

There-

after, the trial was continued from April 30, 1976 to
June 9, 1976 and notice thereon filed May 4, 1976. (R 15).
Defendant's counsel learned that the matter would be continued and
filed the notion for the defendant for an earlier trial date on May 3,
1976, making the said demands under U.C.A.

77-1-8 (6) (1953)

claiming a constitutional right to a speedy trial under
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution.

(R 14)

Notwithstanding the said Notice and Motion for an Earlier
Trial Date, June 9, 1976 continued to be the scheduled time
of defendant's trial.

June 3, 1976, defendant filed his Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint against him; said Motion filed with
Memorandum in Support thereof.

(R 16, 18)

The Motion was again

made before the Court on the day of trial at the beginning thereof but
the Court did not make any decisions thereon until later on
in the trial but reserving to the plaintiff the right to make
any motions that he desired later on in the trial.
On April 19, 1976, the month following the arraignment
of the defendant, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (R 12)
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basing said Motion upon the fact that the defendant had at
the time of the investigation of the matter, while he was
drunk from alcoholic beverages had given a statement of
confession to the crime, but more importantly, the confession
admissions were reduced to writing and the defendant had
signed the said confession notwithstanding the fact that he
could not read or write anything but his own name.
During the course of trial, defendant's mother,
Priscilla Flores, was called to the witness stand and during
her testimony, while she was being cross-examined by the
State, stated that the defendant had been in prison. (Tr. 117,

ln. 24-25)

Because of that statement, the defendant filed a

Motion for a New Trial on the 18th day of June, 1976.

~

59)

Defendant's Notio= of Appeal was timely filed and at the same time,
defense counsel's Notice of Withdrawal.

(R 56, 58 & 63).

Plaintiff

awaited in prison from June 17, 1976 until March 3, 1977 for the appointment of another attorney and subsequent to the appointment of Lyle J.
Barnes, Esq. as counsel by the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah who then filed a Designation of Record on Appeal. (R 68)
Defendant waited from March 3, 1976 until October 3, 1976 for the
transcript of record which was a time during which counsel
for the defendant and the Court and counsel for the State,
together with Mr. Loren Martin, negotiated the question of
transcript and whether or not said transcript should be
-5-
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prepared and made available without cost to the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WHO IS
HELD OR INCARCERATED IN JAIL AWAITING TRIAL
AND HAS BEEN HELD BEYOND THIRTY DAYS IN SAID
CONFINEMENT FOLLOIHNG ARRAIGNMENT AND FOLLOWING
HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL DATE, MAY NOT
BE TRIED AND CONVICTED.
The controling

law governing the disposition of

plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss is Article 1, Section 12 of
the Constitution of Utah which reads:
In criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the
right to ... have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the County or District in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed ...
Also controling is U.C.A. 77-1-8(6):
Rights of the Defendant. In criminal prosecutions,
the defendant is entitled: (6) to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county
in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed; and every defendant in a criminal action
unable to get bail shall be entitled to a trial
within thirty (30) days after arraignment, if the
court is then in session in such county, otherwise,
the trial of such defendant shall be called on the
next day of the next succeeding session of the
court.
These legal requirements have been qualified so that
a defendant must request for trial in order to take
advantage of the guarantee of the trial within thirty days.
State vs. Bohn, 47 UT. 362, 248 P. 19.

On the other hand,
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the defendant is entitled to a dismissal if, in fact, he
makes the request and is not tried within thirty days as
required by the statutes.

State vs. Lozano, 23 UT. 2d,

312, 462 P.2d 710.
POINT II
WHERE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS UNABLE TO
READ OR WRITE THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND WAS
OTHERWISE UNABLE TO FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT
HE WAS DOING
ANY CONFESSION OR ADMISSION
TRANSCRIBED OR ORALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED.
Early in the proceedings on April 19, 1976, plaintiff
filed his Motion to Suppress Evidence relating to a certain
transcribed oral confession or admission given by the defendantappellant to the police officers are Clearfield on the 8th day
of February, 1976.

At that time, a statement was extracted/

On page 2 of the transcript of his statement, we read:
Q:

A.

This was after you had returned to the Delgado residence
to burglarize it and gone back to town?
Yes.

In that statement, the defendant-appellant

was asked informa-

tion regarding burglary of which he is not legally capable or
competent to understand and this, together with the fact that
he was, in fact, a Spanish-American speaking poor English
and unable to read and write the English language was a
rather prejudicial statement and may have been one in which
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he himself was unable to understand or effectively evaluate
at the time he answered in the affirmative.

There was

evidence before the Court that he has been drinking that
day.

The direct testimony of Angelo Cabrero,

who was with

the defendant at the time that he was taken to the police
station on the day of the admissions as indicated herein,
testified as follows:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

On the 17th day of February, 1976, did you have
occasion to transport Mr. Ricky Archuletta to
the Farmington Sheriff's Office?
Yes, sir.
And who's car did you come in?
My car.
Who was present with you?
Jose Flores, Ricky and myself.
Now, at the time that you took him to the
police station, could you explain anything
unusual about his demeanor or his character
at that time?
Yes, sir.
That morning I got up there early,
and I went down next door and we bought a case
of beer and sat drinking.
two o'clock, he
told me he had to go some place and he needed a
ride.
I said, "Okay"
so we kept drinking, and
then about 1:30 we left.
And I left with .. Ricky, and we came early, and
I left him there at the police station. We
waited there for awhile, for an hour, you know
like from 2:00 until about 4:30, then they told
us we could go.
Ricky wasn't going to go,
Ricky was not going to go with us no more.
When you got to the Sheriff's Office, what effect
if any, did the drinking have upon Mr. Archuletta.
Well, he went straight and sit down.
And then he
would stqnd up again, and looking for somebody.
Then he just wait, and then sit down for awhile.
Then five minutes later, you know, a policeman
came in and took him in.
Was he drunk when you got there?
To my knowledge, he was pretty, you know, pretty
affected.
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Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

1, what did the liquor have to do with it,
--how did he feel from that, anything?
Oh, I don't know how he feels, I know how he
looked.
llow did he look?
Like-- I couldn't explain. When you drink about-I don't know how to explain it. Awful.
Not
awful, but I mean-Are you having a rough time speaking the language?
Yes, I do.
\~el

***
Q.
A.

Is it your testimony that he was drunk when you
got there?
Yes, sir.
(T. pgs. 58-59)

From the testimony of Jose Flores who also accompanied
him on that trip to the police station, we read:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Were you present at any time during any consumption
of alcoholic beverage or-Yah. They were drinking in front of my porch.
Did you then later--how long did that occur.
How
long did that take place. That drinking.
How long?
Yes.
For a few hours.
Then were you with them when they went to the
Clearfield Police Department?
Yes.
Is'this the last time you saw Ricky as far as
until later, when you went to the preliminary
hearing.
Yah.
As you got to the Clearfield Police Department,
what was his condition? Could you describe that?
Drunk.

The second defect in admitting the statement of the
defendant which was transcribed and signed by the defendant
is the fact that the officers knew at the time that the
statement was extracted that the defendant was unable to
read and write the English language.

On vore dire

exa~ina-
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Q.

A fEW rrore questions about this: You indicated
that he had some problem being able to understand statements being put to him.
Is that
what you said earlier?

A. We felt he might have.
Q. And its your testimony that he could not read.
A. That's correct.
That's what he stated to us.
The above evidences indicate that defendant-appellant
was unable to make a valid statement.

First, because he

could not understand the meaning of burglarize and answered
in the affirmative.

It was his testimony and that of others,

that he was merely picking up items which had previously
been given to Mr. Archuletta, the defendant-appellant for
the purposes of paying a fine.

Mr. Delgado, however, upon

learning later that a Ralph Gomez, a companion of Mr.
Archuletta was also benefiting from the items, then reneged
on the deal and wanted to charge the individuals Ralph Gomez
and Mr. Archuletta with burglary.

It is obvious that if Mr.

Archuletta was unable to understand the word burglary or
"burglarizing" and attached to that, the meaning only that
he picked up the items from his relative, Mr. Delgado, who
now reneged on the offer and himself being willing to cooperate
with Delgado, the statement given by himself as Sranish-American
unable to read and write and further to fully understand the
English language would be a highly prejudicial statement
-10-
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and could be interpreted by the jury as being an admission
of the part of the defendant-appeallant when, in fact, it
was not.

Nevertheless, as this Motion to Suppress was

brought up during trial, the Court overruled the Motion
and admitted the sworn statement.

(R-53)

Under the circumstances, there is a considerable
question as to whether or not defendant-appellant gave a
voluntary statement.

In the case of State vs. Revera,

94 Ariz. 45, 381 P.2d 584 (1963) there is a demonstration of
what should be done in order to make certain that a
defendant-appeallant, such as Mr. Archuletta, fully understands the statement that he is giving.

In that case, the

defendant was unable to read, speak or understand the
English language

and a Spanish translator was brought in

who then provided the translation so that there would be
no question but what each word given in the statement would
be understood.

Because of the caution that was exercised

in that case, the Court held that the written statement taken
was admissible although the weight thereof could be effected
by the fact that the English language had to be translated.
In the case at bar, there were complicated words which noone could be certain that Mr. Archuletta understood said
words.

One could reasonably

assume from the circumstances
-11-
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that Mr. Archuletta did not consider his act to have been
a crime but merely a possession and sale of goods that the
giver now has reneged on, unless of course, Mr. Archuletta
could understand the word "burlarized."
POINT III
WHERE THE PROSECUTION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
ELICITED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTHER,
PRICILLA FLORES, THE STATEMENT THAT THE
DEFENDAL~T-APPELLANT HAD BEEN IN PRISON, SAID
STATEMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL AND GROUNDS FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
During trial, the defendant's mother, Pricilla Flores,
was called to the witness stand and testified as follows:

Q.
A.

I see now, Ricky is over thirty years of age.
Has
he worked at all during this period of time?
Yah.
Not too much, because he was, he was in
prison.

This statement was made before a jury and would have
the effect of tainting the the character of the defendantappellant, securing a conviction against him.

Under the rules

of evidence, the prosecution was successful in creating character
evidence which is proscribed unless character is, in fact, an
issue created by the defendant-appellant

and constitutes a

reversible error on the part of the prosecution.

Rule 47 of

the Rules of Evidence adopted effective July 1, 1971 reads as
follows:
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's character
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is relevant as tending to prove his conduct on a
specified occasion, such trait may be proved in
the same manner as provided by Rule 46, except
that ... (b) any criminal action evidence of a trait
of an accused character as tending to prove his
guilt or innocence of the offense charged, (i) may
not be excluded by a Judge under Rule 45 if offered
by the accused to prove his innocence, and (ii) if
offered by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may
be admitted only after the accused has introduced
evidence of his good charater.
No objection was made at the time because to do so
would only further dramatize the situation and would leave
no question in the minds of the jury what was said.

As it

was, there was hope that maybe the jury did not hear it.
The most that an objection could have accomplished would
have been for the Court to say in essence that that should
be stricken from the record and from the minds of the jury
which anyone would know would be an impossibility.

Never-

theless, said evidence was made part of the trial and the
defendant's character was brought into question and tainted
by the prosecution and this could constitute grounds for a
new trial.
POINT IV
TIIERE ARE TWO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT,
RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA BEING GRANTED A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AT THIS TIME. (1) BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT
BRING HIM TO TRIAL WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY
STATUTE AND IN SO DOING, HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HAVE
TRIED THE DEFENDANT IN THE FIRST PLACE. (2) DEFENDANT
SUFFERED AS A RESUL'I' OF HIS INABILITY TO PAY FOR A
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL UNTIL THE COURT WAS FINALLY
PERSUADED TO GRANT THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE TRIAL WHICH
FORCED TIIE DEFENDANT TO A\~AIT IN PRISON FOR ANY ACTION
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1)

Failure to Bring the Case to Trial Within the Time
Prescribed by Law
Article 1, secion 12 of the Constitution of Utah

requires that an accused will have a "speedy public trial
by an impartial jury.

U.C.A. 77-1-8

(6) requires that

a.ny defendant who is unable to get bail is entitled to a
trial within thirty days after arraignment.

As indicated

above, in the State vs. Bond case 67 Ut. 362, 248 P.19 has
modified that stating that the application of the above
statute is made only where request is made and trial is not
granted within thirty days.

See also State vs. Lozano, 23

Ut. 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710.
One of the remedies available to the defendant is a
'l)J'rit of Habeas Corpus issuing from this Supreme Court.

In

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Habeas Corpus, Section 51, we read:
Subject to some authority to the contrary, and to
some difference of opinion as to where the
application for the Writ should be made, Habeas
Corpus lies for relief of one who is entitled to
be discharged because of failure to bring the case
to trial within the time prescribed by law.
Again, defendant was arraigned March 30.
first trial setting was April 30

(R 11).

(R 10)

The

Counsel was told a

few days before at the trial that the trial would not be held
on April 30, at which time, plaintiff filed a new motion on
May 30, 1976 for a New Trial Date.

(R 14)

Notwithstanding

this demand, a trial setting issued May 4 for June 9, 1976
which continued to be the trial date through to June 3, 1976
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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through
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filed a Motion to Dismiss
Support thereof.

(R

18)

A

(R 16) with the Memorandum in
Motion to Dismiss was taken up on

the 9th day of June at the time of trial and denied by the
Court on the grounds that it was not noticed up for hearing
before the Court.

(R

53)

It is obvious that the defect could have been cured
any time after the filing of a Motion for an Earlier Trial
Date which was in effect a demand for an earlier trial date
and plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss because of that failure to
provide an earlier trial date was filed June 3 and this was
less than one week prior to trial.
Prior to the time of trial, Judge Swan's Clerk, Jane
Johnson, had had telephone conversations with defense counsel
and was aware of the fact that the delayed trial date was
unacceptable.

While there was some question about an earlier

date having been offered which counsel had no recall of one
having been made, said offer was for the 3rd of June, which
would have been in excess of thirty days even so.
89-90.

See Tr. pgs.

It is clear that in either event, a trial was not pro-

vided within thirty days as required by the statute notwithstanding the fact that a demand had been made.
In all cases, a Writ of Habeas Corpus must follow prior
motions in the trial court for discharge. 58 ALR 1514.

See
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also People vs. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 32 Cal Rp. 44, 383
P.2d 452;

Ra~der v~eople,

138 Colo. 397, 334, P.2d 437.

The convicted defendant, however, has the choice or option
to proceed immediately by habeas corpus after a denial of
his Motion to Dismiss or to reserve the question as one of
the grounds of appeal if convicted.

Ex pa rte, .Meadows, 71

Okla. Crim. 353, 112 P2d 419; 21 Am. Jur 2d Crim. Law Section 256, p. 295 note i.
(2)

Delay in Acquiring Transcript of Record
Differences in access to the instruments
needed to vindicate legal rights, when
based upon the financial situation of the
defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution,
and therefore, Habeas Corpus is available to
enforce the right of an indigent defendant to
transcripts of the proceedings, so as to enable
him effectively to defend himself. 39 Am. Jur.
2d Habeas Corpus, Section 50.
The Designation of. Record on Appeal was filed March

3, 1977, nine months following the trial herein, together
with the Notice of Appearance of Counsel, together with
Defendant's Affidavit of Impecuniosity.

(R. 67, 68, 71)

At that time, it became necessary for counsel to file
a Motion for Extension of Time for Filing Desigation of
Record on Appeal

(R 72) because under the rules, defendant

would be deprived of his right to appeal because of having
failed to prosecute said appeal which was signed by Order of
the Court filed July 21, 1977. (R 73)

Counsel was appointed
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i

by the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah because the

Davis County refused or otherwise neglected to do so.

The

Designation of Record on Appeal included a request for
transcript of the trial.

In the Order which was submitted

(R 73) pursuant to the Motion for Extension of Time, item
#2 thereon required a transcript for trial in the matter be
provided defense counsel.
March 1977,was

S3id Order,dated the 15th day of

not filed until July 21, 1977, approximately

two days prior to a hearing called by Court, at which time,
the Court granted a transcript requiring counsel for the
defendant to advise the reporter of the portion of the
transcript that is needed.

Thereafter, on August 5, 1977

counsel for the defendant filed a Designation of Transcript
(R 75) which was finally completed and billed for against the
County on September 27, 1977.

From the foregoing, it is

apparent that there was a great deal of resistance both as
to the calling of an attorney and to the preparation and
providing of a transcript for the defendant and the defendant
waited from June 17, 1976 until September 26, 1977, a period
of a year and three months, just to proceed with his appeal
because of the fact that he, as an indigent, was unable to
pay his way as some other person would have under similar
circumstances.
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The Supreme Court in the case of Roberts vs. Lavallee,
389 U. S. 40, 19 Law Ed. 2d 41, 88 S.Ct. 194

(1967) issued

'

the following rule:
"Our decisions for more than a decade now have
made clear that differences in access to the
instruments needed to vindicate legal rights,
when based upon the financial situation of the
defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution ...
but to interpose any financial consideration
between an indigent prisoner of the State and
his exercise of a state right to sue for his
liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws. We have no doubt that the
New York statute struck down by the New York
Court of Appeals in Montgomery, as applied to
deny a free transcript to an indigent, could not
meet the test of our prior decisions."
While the transcript was finally provided by the
District Court, it was after much delay, both as to the
providing of an attorney on appeal and as to providing the
free transcript and for a period of time, constituting a
year and three months, the defendant languished in prison
with no recourse at all and now should be given his freedom
because he has been unconstitutionally denied equal protection
of the law.
CONCLUSION
Under Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of
Utah and U.C.A. 77-1-8 (6), the District Court of Davis
County, State of Utah lost jurisdiction over the defendant
and did not, in fact, have the right to proceed in trial·
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but should have dismissed the matter against the defendantappellant and the plaintiff in Complaint for Writ of Habeas
Corpus on file herewith.

Having failed in that, the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah should reverse the decision
denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss issued on the 9th day
of June, 1976 and that failing, the Supreme Court should
issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the same reason.
At trial, the use of the

appellan~s

statement at

the Clearfield Police Department which was written and signed
by appellant

when said appellant was at the time under the

influence of intoxicating liquor and a Spanish-American unable
to read, write and speak the English language or fully
understand its terms and meanings (especially with respect
to "burglarizing") and the use of said statements before the
Court notwithstanding those facts ccnstituted reversible error
and the use of testimony by Mrs. Flores elicited by the prosecution

as to character evidence describing defendant having

been incarcerated in prison, all constitutes reasons for a new
trial which was

denied~

plaintiff on June 9 during trial.

DATED this _ _j~day of November, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
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